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Terrorism as an Intellectual Problem1
CHARLES W. COLLIERt
"This religion is a universal declaration of human liberation on
earth from bondage to other men or to human desires. .

.

. To

declare God's sovereignty means: comprehensive revolution
against human governance in all its perceptions, forms, systems
and conditions and the total defiance against every condition on
earth in which humans are sovereign .
2
Sayyid Qutb

God please save me from your followers.

Bumper Sticker
The past few years have been instructive for observers
of religious terrorism. Events have conspired to reveal ever
more of its grim visage, inner logic, and awful potential.
Religious terrorism has been exhaustively analyzed as a
security problem, a military problem, an economic problem,
a political problem, and more. But it is also an intellectual

1. This Essay focuses mainly on events that occurred and theories that
emerged after September 11, 2001. Newspapers of record are often the primary
sources for accounts of such recent history. See FOUAD AJAMI, THE FOREIGNER'S
GIFT 347 (2006) (describing use of newspaper sources).
t Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Florida. I thank Calum
Carmichael, Lenn Goodman, Jerry Israel, Lyrissa Lidsky, Chris Slobogin,
Michael Walzer, and Danaya Wright for helpful comments, suggestions, and
criticisms. The University of Florida College of Law supported much of my
research and writing with summer research appointments.
This Essay is dedicated to the memory of Francis A. Allen, whose
tremendous encouragement and generous if not extravagant praise of a young
scholar will be repaid in kind.
2. Yvonne Haddad, Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival, in VOICES OF
RESURGENT ISLAM 67, 81 (John Esposito ed., 1983) (quoting Sayyid Qutb).
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problem, one with particular implications for the study of
law, culture, and history. This Essay examines the intellectual
assumptions of religious terrorism, and it does so from
three distinct perspectives: the theory of religion and
American constitutional law (Part I); the common law (Part
II); and cultural and institutional history (Parts III and IV).
I.

RELIGION, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND TERRORISM

One of the most difficult tasks facing intellectuals today
is to reconcile an attitude of tolerance toward religion in
general, and Islam in particular, with a moral condemnation of
terrorism, and with an overall intellectual responsibility for
challenging beliefs that are inherently improbable, unsupported
by evidence, or otherwise contrary to reason. 3 I aim to
strike this balance by focusing on fundamentalism ("strict
adherence to any set of basic ideas or principles" 4) as the
point of contact between religion and terrorism. 5
3. See generally LEWIS WOLPERT, SIX IMPOSSIBLE THINGS BEFORE BREAKFAST:
THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF BELIEF (2006).
In this brief Essay it will not be possible to explore the bases of religious
beliefs in the depths or detail they deserve. I hope only to suggest a few general
principles that go substantially beyond the critical thinking that most religious
believers devote to their own beliefs.
4. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 776 (2d ed.

1987).
5. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM 131 (2003) ("It has now become
normal to describe [religious extremist] movements as fundamentalist. The
term is . . .now common usage."); Paul Scott, Questions for Martin E. Marty:
Sacred Battles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 19 ("Words like
'extremism' or 'fanaticism' miss what followers are extreme or fanatic about.
'Fundamentalism,' however, connotes a fundamental religious vision behind the
movement.").
For a definition of terrorism,see the recent United Nations Security Council
resolution condemning as "under no circumstances justifiable by considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature," S.C. Res. 1566, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004),
[C]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act ....
Id. See generally WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM § 1.01(A)
(2005) (discussing various definitions of terrorism).
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The argument advanced here is thus no more hostile to
the claims of religion or Islam than to those of astrology,
alchemy, sorcery, magic, mysticism, pantheism, transcendentalism,
solipsism, shamanism, Satanism, superstition, "luck" (good
or bad), faith healing, fortune-telling, extrasensory
perception, or vacation bible school. I wish the practitioners
of all those enterprises every success. I object only when
they take their enterprises seriously and literally, and put
them at the service of fundamentalism (by, for example,
terrorizing "infidels" or "unbelievers" who do not share in
an unlikely assortment of inherently unverifiable beliefs).
It might be objected that taking one's religion "seriously
and literally" is hardly unique to Muslims, and that even if
it were, violence and terrorism are hardly the inevitable
result (it could make one a monk or a hermit, a saint or a

fool).6 One could cite a few salient factors in response: the

humorless lack of irony so characteristic of contemporary
Islamic fundamentalism; 7 its virulent and often violent
intolerance of competing religious traditions (even within
their own lands of origin);8 its insistence that unprovable
and implausible (and thus deeply contested) religious
beliefs be the basis for social, political, and governmental
decision-making; 9 and its elevation of the sharia over
domestic law and of jihdd over customary international

6. These objections are drawn from comments by an anonymous referee for
the Journalof Legal Studies (on file with author).
7. See Roger Scruton, Op-Ed., 'Islamofascism,'WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2006, at
A8 ("[I]t is from a posture of irony that every real negotiation, every offer of
peace, every acceptance of the other, begins.").
8. See, e.g., Daniel Schwammenthal, Op-Ed., Europe's New Dissidents, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 4-5, 2006, at A8 ("The Islamists demand no less than absolute
supremacy for their religion-and not only in the Muslim world but wherever
Muslims may happen to reside. That's why they see no hypocrisy in their
demand for 'respect' for Islam while the simple display of a cross or a Star of
David in Saudi Arabia is illegal."); see also Alan Abelson, Off with Their Heads,
BARRON'S, Feb. 13, 2006, at 8 ("Lest we be the target of a fatwa (remember
Salman Rushdie), let us say we understand perfectly why those angry Islamic
mobs are so angry. All they're demanding, after all, is that you observe their
customs when you're in their country and you observe their customs when
you're in your country.").
9. See, e.g., BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? 100 (2002) ("The idea that
any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any
sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim
thought.").
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law. 10 Nevertheless, these are at best necessary though not
sufficient conditions, and it may be impossible to identify
all the remaining, additional factors that make Islamic
fundamentalism the leading source of contemporary
terrorism. But, that it is the leading source is not, as an
empirical matter (and as documented in this Essay), in
serious dispute.1 1 Indeed, this counts as one of the defining
features of the present era.1 2 In this way, as the night

10. See, e.g., LENN E. GOODMAN, ISLAMIC HUMANISM 49 (2003) ("[E]very
major Muslim movement in history has claimed political as well as spiritual
authority, and many have used military and other coercive means to win their
claims, even as they used spiritual inspiration to legitimate their temporal
authority. That jihdd, construed as military contest aimed at the expansion of
Islam, should be counted a central institution of Islam reflects the worldly
claims made by Islam in behalf of otherworldly aims."); Tawfik Hamid, Op-Ed.,
The Trouble with Islam, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A15 ("It is vital to grasp
that traditional and even mainstream Islamic teaching accepts and promotes
violence. Shariah, for example, allows apostates to be killed, permits beating
women to discipline them, seeks to subjugate non-Muslims to Islam as dhimmis
and justifies declaring war to do so. It exhorts good Muslims to exterminate the
Jews before the 'end of days.' The near deafening silence of the Muslim majority
against these barbaric practices is evidence enough that there is something
fundamentally wrong.").
11. See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 137 ("Most Muslims are not fundamentalists,
and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present-day terrorists are
Muslims and proudly identify themselves as such."); John Kifner, Massacre
Draws Self-Criticism in Muslim Press, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A8 ('It is a
certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and
exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims,' Abdel Rahman alRashed, the general manager of the widely watched satellite television station
Al Arabiya said .. ").
12. To take an example almost at random, in a single busy day for Islamic
terrorism the following stories from around the world all appeared on the same
front page of the New York Times on September 1, 2004:
16 Are Killed in Two Bombings in Israel (complete with graphic, four-column
color photo showing lifeless bodies hanging out of bus windows), stating "[t]he
terrorist group Hamas claimed responsibility." Steven Erlanger, 16 Are Killed
in Two Bombings in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at Al.
Talks to Disarm Shiites Collapse: "Also on Tuesday, a militant Islamic group
announced a mass killing in Iraq, showing pictures of 12 dead Nepali laborers
for a Jordanian company." Dexter Filkins & Erik Eckholm, Talks To Disarm
Shiites Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at Al.
Suicide Bomber Kills 9 in Russia: "A group linking itself to Al Qaeda and the
conflict in Chechnya claimed responsibility for the attack, as it did for the terror
bombings of two Russian airliners a week ago." Steven Lee Meyers, Suicide
Bomber Kills 9 in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at Al.
This edition came out a few hours too early to include news of the hostage-
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follows the day, "the culture of terrorism [has] put down
roots in Arab lands."' 3
It was not an isolated band of misguided young men who came
America's way on 9/11. They emerged out of the Arab world's
dominant culture and malignancies. There were the financiers
who subsidized the terrorism. There were the intellectuals who
winked at the terrorism and justified it. There were the
preachers-from Arabia to Amsterdam and Finsbury Park-who
gave it religious sanction and cover. And there were the Arab
rulers whose authoritarian orders produced the terrorism4 and who
1
looked away from it so long as it targeted foreign shores.

There is of course much to distinguish superstition, say,
from religious fundamentalism, not to mention terrorism.

But what connects them is their shared acceptance of what
taking and torture in Beslan that left over 300 Russian schoolchildren, parents,
and teachers dead. See David Brooks, Cult of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2004,
at A23 ("We should by now have become used to the death cult that is thriving
at the fringes of the Muslim world .... This is the cult that sent waves of
defenseless children to be mowed down on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war,
that trains kindergartners to become bombs, that fetishizes death, that sends
people off joyfully to commit mass murder."); Thomas L. Friedman, At a Theater
Near You ... , N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at A19 ("Of course, not all Muslims are
terrorists. But it's been widely noted that virtually all suicide terrorists today
are Muslims. Angry Norwegians aren't doing this-nor are starving Africans or
unemployed Mexicans. Muslims have got to understand that a death cult has
taken root in the bosom of their religion, feeding off it like a cancerous tumor.").
13. FOUAD AJAMI, THE FOREIGNER'S GIFT,at xi (2006).

14. Id. at xi-xii; see also Fouad Ajami, Heart of Darkness, Op-Ed., WALL ST.
J., Sept. 28, 2005, at A16 ("The extremist is never just a man of the fringe: He
always works at the outer edges of mainstream life, playing out the hidden
yearnings and defects of the dominant culture. Zarqawi is a bigot and a killer,
but he did not descend from the sky. He emerged out of the Arab world's sins of
omission and commission .... Zarqawi's war, it has to be conceded, is not his
alone; he kills and maims, he labels the Shiites rafida (rejecters of Islam), he
charges them with treason as 'collaborators of the occupiers and the crusaders,'
but he can be forgiven the sense that he is a holy warrior on behalf of a wider
Arab world that has averted its gaze from his crimes, that has given him its
silent approval. He and the band of killers arrayed around him must know the
meaning of this great Arab silence."); Abdurrahman Wahid, Right Islam vs.
Wrong Islam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2005, at A16 ("While a few are quick to shed
blood themselves, countless millions of others sympathize with their violent
actions, or join in the complicity of silence .... Islamic fundamentalism has
become a well-financed, multifaceted global movement that operates like a
juggernaut in much of the developing world .... The armed ghazis (Islamic
warriors) raiding from New York to Jakarta, Istanbul, Baghdad, London and
Madrid are only the tip of the iceberg, forerunners of a vast and growing
population that shares their radical views and ultimate objectives.").
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would not count as evidence for a scientist, what would not
count as authority for a political philosopher, and what
would not count as justification for a moral philosopher.
Terrorism merely represents the extreme position on each
of these three axes. In other words: religion, fundamentalism,
and terrorism are situated on a continuum. It is a
tortuously long, complicated, and variegated continuum;
but it is a continuum nonetheless.
Andrew Sullivan writes:
If you believe that there is an eternal afterlife, and that endless
indescribable torture awaits those who disobey God's law, then it
requires no huge stretch of imagination to make sure that you not
only conform to each diktat but that you also encourage and, if
necessary, coerce others to do the same. The logic behind this is
impeccable. Sin begets sin. The sin of others can corrupt you as
well. The only solution is to construct a world in which such sin is
outlawed and punished and constantly purged-by force if
necessary. It is not crazy to act this way if you believe these things
ways, it's crazier to believe these things
strongly enough. In some
15
and not act this way.

Even so sympathetic an interpreter of religious language as

Ian Ramsey describes religion as "a dominating loyalty
linked with a world view"'16 or, more specifically, a
discernment that "there are situations which are spatiotemporal and more'' 17 and a commitment that is "based
upon but goes beyond rational considerations."' 8 A man
might (to use Ramsey's examples) leap into a raging flood to
rescue his child even when there is little chance of success,
or crawl down a precarious mountain precipice in a
desperate attempt to save his wife against all odds.' 9 But he
should not expect others-who lack his commitment-to do
the same. Yet this is precisely what fundamentalism (at
least in its more messianic, politicized versions) expects,
indeed demands. One of the latest communications from Al

15. Andrew Sullivan, This Is a Religious War, N.Y.
(Magazine), at 44.

16.

IAN

T. RAMSEY,

18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 17-19.

Oct. 7, 2001, § 6

RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE: AN EMPIRIcAL PLACING OF THEOLOGICAL

PHRASES 18 (Macmillan Paperbacks ed. 1963) (1957).
17. Id. at 16.

TIMES,
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Qaeda, for example, threatens further terrorist attacks
unless 20
(among other things) "all Americans . ..convert to
Islam."
Leading scholars of Islamic religion and politics have
not failed to make this connection between fundamentalism
and terrorism. "It is the hallmark of unsettled societies to
believe in the man on horseback," observes Fouad Ajami,
"in millennial and sudden redemption, in the pretender who
would transform and empower a broken world, but without
labor and effort and empirical work."'21 Both fundamentalism
and terrorism offer those who "flock[] to their banners an
absolution from responsibility, and a dream of revenge. ' 22 A
modern-day miracle has indeed been served up for the
masses, but they would not have seen it with their own eyes
if they had not believed it.
Bernard Lewis, exploring "what went wrong" in the
Islamic world since the Middle Ages, points out that "[s]ince
the state was Islamic ...[t]he state was the church and the
church was the state .... ,,23 And when the states in
question amount to "a string of shabby tyrannies, ranging
from traditional autocracies to new-style dictatorships,
modern only in their apparatus of repression and
indoctrination," 24 the connection with terrorism becomes
more than just coincidental as its attraction becomes more
than just theoretical.
Samuel Huntington goes beyond the position advanced
here in singling out religion (not just religious fundamentalism)
as the main source of the world's problems. Religion is "the

20. Craig S. Smith, Kuwait Says a Senior Qaeda Member Has Confessed to
Planning 2 Attacks in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, § 1, at 20; accord

LEWIS, supra note 5, at 31-32 ("The presumption is that the duty of jihad will
continue, interrupted only by truces, until all the world either adopts the
Muslim faith or submits to Muslim rule."); Steven Erlanger, Fox News
JournalistsFree After DeclaringConversion on Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006,
at A3; Qaeda Video Demands Conversion to Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2006, §1,
at 8.
21. Fouad Ajami, Op-Ed., Two Faces, One Terror, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2002, at A12.
22. Id.
23. LEWIS, supranote 9, at 101.
24. Id. at 151.
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principal defining characteristic of civilizations, ' 25 he
argues, and "possibly the most profound difference that can
exist between people. ' 26 Based in part on Muslims' greatly
disproportionate involvement in violent conflict around the
27
world, particularly along "Islam's bloody borders,"
Huntington concludes that "[t]he underlying problem for
the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a
different civilization whose people are convinced of the
superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the
inferiority of their power." 28 Whatever the merits of
Huntington's specific analysis, one can easily see in religion
the defining conditions of fundamentalism (strongly held
beliefs that no amount of empirical evidence can prove or
disprove); 29 and these "profound differences" in belief serve
in turn as the ideological basis for terrorism.
In this context Huntington's broader point about
"religion as the problem" assumes added importance. The
relevant "clash" need not be styled as one solely between
Islam and the West. There are plenty of works studiously
tracing the contemporary Sunni-Shiite split back to
conflicts in the seventh century A.D. 30 But the idea that it
could possibly matter now who was really the rightful heir
to the caliphate in 632, or 658, or 680, and that (depending
on which sect one happened to be raised in) this provides a
reason or basis for killing believers in the other doctrine (as
in present-day Iraq), is absurd at best. As Karl Popper once
recalled (in a different but related context):
These theories appeared to be able to explain practically
everything ....The study of any of them seemed to have the effect
of an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a
new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes

25. SAMUEL

P.

OF WORLD ORDER

HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING

253 (1996).

26. Id. at 254.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 217; cf. id. at 254-58 (documenting "[tihe Muslim propensity
toward violent conflict").
29. See generally KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS, 33-65 (5th
ed. 1989) (describing falsifiability as a fundamental criterion of scientific
knowledge).
30. See, e.g., VALI NASR, THE SHIA REVIVAL: How CONFLICTS WITHIN ISLAM
WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE (2006).
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were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the
world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened
always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and
unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the
manifest truth . ... 31

Among true believers, there is nothing that would count as
a disproof of God's existence; 32 and if a belief cannot in
principle be disproved, then it cannot meaningfully 33be
proved either (or empirically confirmed or disconfirmed).
I would be content to rest my case here were it not for
the constitutional provisions barring Congress (and, as
judicially extended, the states) from "establishing" religion
or prohibiting its free exercise. 34 How should fundamentalism,
as the intersection of religion and terrorism, be plotted on
the charts of constitutional law? What are the
constitutional limits of religious extremism?
Justice Frankfurter once remarked that "the safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies
involving not very nice people. '35 Certainly, terrorists and
other religious extremists are right at the top of the list of
"not very nice people," and it is a fair question whether
constitutional rights should extend to them at all. But the
possibility that fundamentalism and religious extremism
might merit constitutional protection cannot be dismissed
out of hand, given the "preferred position" of religion in

31. POPPER, supra note 29., at 34-35.
32. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraudand

Conspiracy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at Al (quoting Kenneth L. Lay,
upon being convicted of conspiracy, securities fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and
false statements, as saying: "We believe that God in fact is in control and indeed
he does work all things for good for those who love the Lord."). A few weeks
later, Mr. Lay was dead.
33. This is a very brief version of a very complex subject; for a longer
version, see Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 91 (Imre
Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).

34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); cf.
STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH-AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too 102 (1994) ('Nowadays the First Amendment is the First Refuge of

Scoundrels."').
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American law. 36 In order to effect the constitutional purposes
of the religion clauses, religion has been defined very
broadly, generously, and expansively. Indeed, inquiries into
the truth or plausibility of religious claims are (supposed to
be) off-limits for courts and juries.
These principles are most clearly on display in the case
of United States v. Ballard.37 There, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled, in effect, that what would otherwise be a clear
case of fraud might yet be protected activity, if the content
of the fraud was religious doctrine. The Ballards consulted
regularly with all manner of departed and reincarnated
souls, including Jesus, George Washington, and a seventeenth
century occultist named St. Germain des Pres. On the basis
of their extensive contacts in the afterworld and their
stellar qualifications as "ascended masters," the Ballards
offered to heal those afflicted with otherwise incurable
diseases and solicited money for that purpose-hence the
charge of mail fraud.
The trial court ruled that "the religious beliefs of these
defendants cannot be an issue in this court." 38 Instead, the
court substituted a different issue: "Did these defendants
honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did,
they should be acquitted. '' 39 The Supreme Court agreed
with this statement of the law, noting that "[m]en may
believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the
proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious
real as life to some may be
experiences which are as 40
incomprehensible to others."
In effect, both courts defended a view of religion much
like Ramsey's notion of a commitment that "goes beyond
rational considerations." 4 1 As the trial court put it, "[s]ome
of the teachings of the defendants ...might seem extremely
improbable to a great many people. For instance .
shaking hands with Jesus, to some people that might seem
36. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.").
37. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 86.
41. RAMSEY, supra note 16, at 19.
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highly improbable" 42-if, in Ramsey's sense, they did not
share the defendants'
non-rational or even irrational
"commitments."43
Normally, you and I do not believe highly improbable
things, and we assume others do not either; if they claim to,
we suspect they are insincere (or mentally unbalanced). 44 In
Ballard, the court disallowed this normal process of
reasoning and thereby carved out a realm of belief (called
"religion") wherein people may believe whatever they like,
without fear of any official contradiction based solely on the
implausibility of their beliefs. For legal purposes, the only
touchstone of religion consistent with "the widest possible
toleration of conflicting views" 45 is Ramsey's "commitment"
or William James's "seriousness" or Matthew Arnold's "high
seriousness which comes from absolute sincerity."46 The
truth of religious belief is not justiciable, only its genuineness.
"The judges honored the First Amendment by not putting
47
religious truth on trial," concludes Judge Noonan.
"Silently they incorporated in their decisions the cultural,
American, Jamesian preference for judging not the content
of the belief but48 the manner in which the belief was held by
an individual."
The Ballard doctrine grants a kind of free pass to
religion, including fundamentalism of all sorts. Subjecting
religious doctrines to constitutional review would present
enormous practical difficulties, so the plausibility of those
doctrines-not to mention their truth or falsity, or even
their proper interpretation-is taken off the table. Thus,
the constitutional protection of whatever claims to be

42. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81.
43. RAMSEY, supranote 16, at 19.
44. See generally PSYCHOSIS

AND

SPIRITUALITY:

EXPLORING

THE

NEW

FRONTIER 191-207 (Isabel Clarke ed., 2001) (discussing religious and delusional
beliefs); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 257 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing
"religion as madness" in law).
45. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
46. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 566 (2001) (quoting Noonan's discussion of William James and
Matthew Arnold in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 168-69
(1998) [hereinafter NOONAN, LUSTRE]).
47. NOONAN, LUSTRE, supra note 46, at 168-69.

48. Id.
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"religion" is in no sense a warrant of its rationality, but
almost the very opposite. Those seeking a reasoned critique
of the conceptual steps leading from religion to fundamentalism
to terrorism must look elsewhere.
II. TERRORISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE PAST
Perhaps most characteristic of today's terrorists is their
urge to rewrite history. In this way they imperfectly
assimilate another defining aspect of legal modernity: the
common law.
The emergence of the common law is not a recent
development; given its nature, it could not be a recent
development. The common law is based fundamentally on
the recognition that historical claims carry their own sort of
legitimacy, authority, and validity. 49 Today's terrorists have
a long list of grievances, some of which date back decades,
even centuries. The common law provides an intellectual
basis for putting those grievances in historical perspective.
A claim that was at one time arguable may nevertheless be
overtaken by the course of history. Conversely, even if a
claim was originally dubious-morally, legally, logically,
etc.-it may yet pass the test of time, eventually. Those who
deny altogether the claims of history pattern their response
on Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty: 'When I use a word,'
Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."'5 0
But no one can choose what the words of a language
mean-in the past, the present, or the future. Language is
the affair of everyone, hence the property of no one. To an
extent unparalleled in other social institutions, everyone
participates in language, which is why it is constantly being
influenced by all. Only the community is able to establish a
linguistic system-i.e., to institute values whose sole raison
d'etre lies in common usage and consent-and even it can do
so only over time.
Language always presents itself to the individual (and
to the community at any given time) as an already
49. See generally Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A
CriticalHistory, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 771.
50. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 70 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1986) (1872).
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established system, articulated in a traditional fashion that
transcends the will of the individual, even that of the
community at any particular time. "At any given period,
however far back in time we go, a language is always an
inheritance from the past .... In fact, no society has ever
known its language to be anything other than something
inherited from previous generations, which it has no choice
but to accept." 51 Thus the notion of a linguistic tradition is
logically incompatible with the possibility of deliberate
enactment or human choice. Still, it is clear that languages
do change, even if no one in particular is capable of
changing them. 52 "Rules acquire and lose the status of
traditions by growing, being practised, ceasing to be
practised, and decaying; and rules brought into being or
eliminated otherwise than by these slow, involuntary
processes could not thereby acquire or lose the status of
tradition." 53 At this point the theory of language
development begins to resemble the theory of the common
law.
Sir William Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth
century, explained the common law as essentially the
ratification of custom. Custom has a normative basis,
though this is not always immediately evident. Usually the
explanation that "It's just our custom" is sufficient (for
example, the custom that men remove their hats in church).
Someone who persisted and inquired "Well, why have that
custom?"54 would have deeply misunderstood the nature of
custom.

51. FERDINAND

DE SAUSSURE,

COURSE IN

GENERAL LINGUISTICS

71,

72

(Charles Bally et al. eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court 1986) (1916).
52. The only way to preserve the "purity" of a language, remarks Saussure,
would be to remove it from circulation. If a speaking populace actually took up
an artificial language like Esperanto, it too would immediately be out of the
control of its inventors and would change like any other language; it would then
be "impossible to turn the clock back." Id. at 76.
53. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 176 (2d ed. 1994) ("The story,
perhaps apocryphal, that the headmaster of a new English public school
announced that, as from the beginning of the next term, it would be a tradition
of the school that senior boys should wear a certain dress, depends for its comic
effect wholly on the logical incompatibility of the notion of a tradition with that
of deliberate enactment and choice.").
54. See, e.g., SAUSSURE, supra note 51, at 74 ("[T]o say that a language is a
product of social forces does not automatically explain why it comes to be
constrained in the way it is. Bearing in mind that a language is always an
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The common law consists of legal maxims and customs
that are, according to Blackstone, "of higher antiquity than
memory or history can reach: nothing being more difficult
than to ascertain the precise beginning and first spring of
an ancient and long established custom. ' 55 To our usual
way of thinking, this "difficulty" would seem to count
against the authority of a custom whose origins are so
murky; but Blackstone draws exactly the opposite
conclusion in his next sentence. "Whence it is" (implying
that what comes next follows logically) "that in our law the
goodness of a custom depends upon its having been used
time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase,
time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
56
contrary. This it is that gives it its weight and authority."
A normative premise seems to be implied here: these
maxims and customs have been observed for so long (so
long that "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary")
that they now ought to be-deserve to be-observed. In this
sense it is neither circular nor paradoxical to assert that
"the only method of proving, that this or that maxim is a
that it hath been
rule of the common law, is by showing
57
always the custom to observe it."
In a slightly different formulation Blackstone says
elsewhere that these legal maxims and customs "receive
their binding power, and the force of laws . . . by their
universal reception throughout the kingdom." 58 That last
phrase is amplified as follows: "the authority of these
maxims rests entirely upon general reception and usage .... -59
Here the emphasis is on breadth of acceptance, which
inheritance from the past, one must add that the social forces in question act
over a period of time. If stability is a characteristic of languages, it is not only
because languages are anchored in the community. They are also anchored in
time. The two facts are inseparable. Continuity with the past constantly
Ultimately there is a connexion between these
restricts freedom of choice ....
two opposing factors: the arbitrary convention which allows free choice, and the
passage of time, which fixes that choice."); see also id. at 76-77 (explaining that
languages or language rules adopted by deliberate enactment are still subject to
historical change).
55. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *67.

56. Id.
57. Id. at *68.
58. Id. at *64.

59. Id. at *68.
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implies a second normative premise: these maxims and
customs have been observed so widely and universally that
they ought to be observed here too. The common law is in
this sense 60 "a law common to all the realm, the jus
commune."
These principles and normative assumptions of the
common law may be clarified by means of an example.
Suppose you own a tract of land that lies between my home
and my favorite fishing pond. You have every legal right to
exclude me from your property-e.g., by building a wall, a
moat, an electrified fence; placing warning signs ("No
Trespassing"), armed guards, and watch towers around the
perimeter. Corresponding to your absolute legal right to
exclude me is my absolute lack of any legal right to enter
upon your property (disregarding a few exceptions not
applicable here). If I do, you may have me arrested and
prosecuted for trespass.
But suppose I enter upon your land anyway (taking a
60. Id. at *67. An implied argument for these two normative premises of the
common law can also be reconstructed. The older and more widely accepted the
custom, so goes the argument, the more it represents the objective, accumulated
wisdom of the ages, and the less it represents someone's (anyone's) subjective,
personal choice. Legal and political legitimacy are classically tied to "the
consent of the governed," but universal suffrage is not the only way that consent
can be expressed. "'For where is the difference,"' asks the Emperor Julian,
'whether the people declare their assent to a law by suffrage, or by a uniform
course of acting accordingly?' Id. at *73-74 (citing DIG. 1.3.32 (Julian, Digest
84)); see also 25 Hen. 8, c. 21 (1533) (Eng.), an Act for the exoneration from
exactions paid to the See of Rome:
[T]his your grace's realm, recognizing no superior under God but only
your grace, has been and is free from subjection to any man's laws, but
only to such as have been devised, made, and ordained within this
realm for the wealth of the same; or to such other as, by sufferance of
your grace and your progenitors, the people of this your realm have
taken at their free liberty, by their own consent, to be used among
them; and have bound themselves by long use and custom to the
observance of the same; not as to the observance of the laws of any
foreign prince, potentate, or prelate; but as to the customed and ancient
laws of this realm, originally established as laws of the same, by the
said sufferance, consents, and custom; and none otherwise.
DAVID LITTLE, RELIGION, ORDER, AND LAW 181 (1984) (translating the Act into

modern English).
In this sense the common law has been, as Sir Edward Coke put it, "prooued
and approuedby continuall experience to be good and profitable for the common
wealth." SIR EDWARD COKE, LE QUART PART DES REPORTES B2 (1604) (emphasis
added).
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shortcut to my fishing pond). Suppose I do so in broad
daylight, "openly and notoriously," every day for twenty
years, and you do nothing about it. Now, according to the
law of prescriptive easements, I have a legal right to do
what I previously had no right to do at all; and you now
have no legal right to exclude me from "my" shortcut any
more.
How did that happen? Was it through the mere passage
of time? No; during that time a number of relevant things
were happening (e.g., the "trespasser" was acting as an
owner), and other relevant things were conspicuously not
happening (e.g., the actual owner was not acting as an
owner). The result ordained by the law of prescriptive
easements simply ratifies this trend of actual historical
usage and custom. 61
The historical claims of modern-day terrorism should be
considered in this context of customary law. There is
undoubtedly much about the past few centuries that
terrorists-and the Islamic Middle East generally-would
61. A number of public policies could be invoked to explain this legal result
(for example, the policy against tying up land for long periods of time, making it
useless to anyone). See, e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 87-90 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing "community
expectations"); William W. Fisher III, The Law of the Land: An Intellectual
History of American Property Doctrines 1776-1880, in PROPERTY: LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE 506, 506-11 (Curtis J. Berger & Joan C. Williams eds., 4th
ed. 1997). But a better explanation may be simply that "custom is good." (For
Blackstone, judicial precedents that result in absurd or unjust decisions are not
"bad law," they are "not law; that is . . . not the established custom of the
realm." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *70.).
Customary law embodies the actual historical norms of those who practice
it, and reflects their implied consent as it ratifies the normative implications of
history and custom. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or.
1969) (discussing prescriptive easements but applying customary law in
upholding public access to Oregon's beaches). The law of prescriptive easements
is still alive and well. For an interesting case upholding prescriptive rights to
pasture, firewood, and timber-partly on the basis of Mexican custom and
settlement tradition-see Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002).
"Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,
and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of
society." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). "[T]he beautiful capacity for growth which
characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite
protection, without the interposition of the legislature." Id. at 195; see also
Charles W. Collier, Law As Interpretation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779, 802-07
(2000) (legal innovation in the common law).
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wish to change. Lewis's list of "what went wrong" is lengthy
and sobering: "By all the standards that matter in the
modern world-economic development and job creation,
literacy and educational and scientific achievement,
political freedom and respect for human rights-what was
once a mighty civilization has indeed fallen low. '62 The
traditional, fundamentalist response has always been: "let
us go back to our roots, to the good old ways, to the true
faith, to the word of God. '6 3 This is of course a religious
response, but it is also, perhaps more fundamentally, a
deeply ahistorical response. 64 It implies that the present
situation is not determined in any important ways by the
past, that the creeping claims of custom, usage, convention,
and tradition (like the legal claims of adverse possession
and easements by prescription) are as nothing, to be swept
aside in an inspired flourish. It implies, most of all, that we
can in fact return to "the good old ways" with no material
readjustment, as if nothing relevant had happened during
the intervening centuries, as if the good old ways could
simply be reinstated just as they were in the good old days.
This is, properly speaking, the stuff of myth (with a touch of
science fiction).65

62. LEWIS, supranote 9, at 152.
63. Id. at 45; cf. GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 211 (quoting Qur'an 48:23,
33:62: "This is God's way, established of old. Thou wilt never find change in
God's way.").
64. See, e.g., TARIF KHALIDI, ARABIC HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE CLASSICAL

PERIOD 8 (1994) ("[Tlhe Qur'an pans over a landscape where time is less a
chronology than a continuum, where Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad
are all described in a grammatical tense which one is tempted to call the eternal
present.").
For a chilling example at the level of personal history, see Jay Solomon &
Karby Leggett, Amid Ties to Iran, Hezbollah Builds Its Own Identity, WALL ST.
J., July 21, 2006, at Al ("Mr. Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary general ... was
held in even higher esteem when, upon viewing the bodies of the dead fighters,
he didn't linger any longer over his own son's body than over the others.").
65. See, e.g., H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895); Scott, supra note 5, at
19 ("Islam has a loyalty to every word of the Koran, but its history has unfolded
in different ways in different social climates. The fundamentalist, however, says
there was a moment in history when a particular book, leader and original
social community was perfect ... and in their selective retrieval they go back to
that perfect moment.").
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III. THE MYTHICAL WORLD-VIEW

The further back we trace the origins of symbols, the
clearer their meaning becomes. It may not be an
exaggeration to say that, for primitive man, the whole
world is symbolic. What we would consider actual historical
persons, places, and events are all assimilated in primitive
thought to timeless religious dramas and underlying
mythical archetypes. Even today, in the "Holy Land" of the
Middle East, otherwise barren, desolate patches of dusty
desert land are thought to be "sacred" because something of
religious significance supposedly happened there hundreds,
even thousands, of years ago. Evidently, for the true
believer, these are more than just patches of land; they
point beyond themselves, they represent something more
important. But to the disinterested observer, the "sacred"
land looks just like all the other land. Why should it matter
if something important happened there many years ago?
"If we observe the general behavior of archaic man,"
writes Mircea Eliade,
we are struck by the following fact: neither the objects of the
external world nor human acts, properly speaking, have any
autonomous intrinsic value. Objects or acts acquire a value, and in
so doing become real, because they participate, after one fashion or
another, in a reality that transcends them ....[E]verything which
66
lacks an exemplary model is "meaningless," i.e., it lacks reality.

For primitive man the world itself is defined in terms of
meaningfulness. It consists of the populated and cultivated
regions, the navigable rivers, the charted seas, the
mountains that have been climbed-in other words, "the
world that surrounds us . . . the world in which the
presence and the work of man are felt. ' 67 This world is
meaningful because every aspect of it has a corresponding
place in the parallel world of myth and religion, beginning
with the myth of creation.
A certain plant, for example, might be highly valued not
because it is precious in itself but because it refers back to

66. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE MYTH OF THE ETERNAL RETURN 3-4, 34 (Willard R.

Trask trans., 1965) (1949).
67. Id. at 9.
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the mythical, timeless past-perhaps it was first gathered
by a god. 68 "[F]or the traditional societies, all the important
'6 9
acts of life were revealed ab origine by gods or heroes.
This means that "all the important acts of life" are
symbolic, in the sense that they merely represent and
repeat episodes from a kind of master plan. In and of
themselves, and without supporting references to that
master script, they have no meaning or value.
Beyond the boundaries of the meaningful world lie
desert regions inhabited by monsters, uncultivated lands,
uncharted waters, and unclimbed mountains. These are all
fittingly designated terra incognita on the ancient maps. In
mythology they are assimilated to chaos, the formless void
prior to creation. Here there are no rituals for erecting
temples or blessing the first crops, for the simple reason
that there are no temples and no crops. Paraphrasing
"the
Wittgenstein, we might say that for primitive man
70
limits of my symbolism are the limits of my world."
The main function of mythology is to provide a
satisfactory explanation for events which (if they happened
at all) occurred so long ago that-as with ancient custom"the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." But
whereas custom and history merge into a continuously
evolving present, myth remains permanently stuck in that
remote, timeless, and unchanging past. In studying
primitive societies "one characteristic has especially struck
us," relates Eliade: "it is their revolt against concrete,
historical time, their nostalgia for a periodical return to the
mythical time of the beginning of things."71 Myths of
creation, of course, refer back explicitly to events in illo
tempore or ab origine. But all myths, says Eliade, are based
on standard archetypes derived from that sacred time
before history; in retelling the myth we simply repeat what
for the first time
happened "when the ritual was performed
72
by a god, an ancestor, or a hero."
68. See id. at 30.
69. Id. at 32.
70. LUDWIG WIrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

1

5.6, at 115

(Ted Honderich ed., D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1963) ("The limits of
my language mean the limits of my world.").
71. ELIADE, supranote 66, at ix.

72. Id. at 21.
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Eliade also describes the process by which actual
historical events and persons become assimilated to
mythical archetypes. In general, "[a] series of contemporary
events is given an articulation and an interpretation that
conform with the atemporal model of the heroic myth."7 3
Sometimes this process is so foreshortened that the
conversion of historical fact into myth takes place within a
single generation. Eliade recounts the story of a Romanian
folk ballad in which a young suitor was bewitched by a
mountain fairy; a few days before he was to be married, the
jealous fairy flung him from a cliff to his death. This was
said to be a very old story about things from "long ago."
Upon investigation, it turned out that the underlying
events had occurred not quite forty years earlier; the
principal witnesses still lived in the same village, and the
young man had simply slipped and fallen over a cliff. 74
Nevertheless, it was the mythical version that persisted
among the villagers.
[T]he authentic historical fact ... as such, could not satisfy them:

the tragic death of a young man on the eve of his marriage was
something different from a simple death by accident ....Besides,
was not the myth truer by the fact that it made the real 75
story yield
a deeper and richer meaning, revealing a tragic destiny?
IV. THE FRAGILITY OF CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

For events of comparable resonance with today's
terrorists one would probably have to turn to the partition
of Kashmir, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the
establishment of a Jewish state within the territory of
Palestine. The saga of the Palestinian homeland, in
particular, undoubtedly owes its powerful grip on the
popular imagination to its association with the myth of
73. Id. at 38.
74. See id. at 44-45.
75. Id. at 45-46; cf. GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 163 ("History needs diachronic
time just as astronomy needs parallax, to objectify distance and distinguish real
from apparent magnitude. Without a firm chronology, the recent past rapidly
sinks into the deeper abyss. Social memory, without some transgenerational
ordering principle, merges the doings of the last generation with archaic
antiquity-as witness the primal myths that some island folklores have
attached to events as recent as the crash landing of a World War II airplane.").
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paradise. That vision is prevalent among "three generations
of refugees who are trapped by poverty, political calculation
own longing for plots of the land in what is now
and their
76
Israel."
With a dreamer's smile and one word, Muhammad Aziz summed
up his vision of home: "Paradise."
That home has been gone for more than half a century, more
than twice as long as Mr. Aziz, 24, has been alive. He has never
seen Simsim, but he has heard his father describe it so often he
sees it in his dreams. He means to return home, God willing, one
day.
There are millions of Palestinians like Mr. Aziz, yearning to go
home, to places where they have never lived.
It is their vision of earthly paradise lost ... that motivates them,
said Dr. Nizar Rayan, a leader here of the Islamic group Hamas.
Iyad Sarraj, a psychiatrist and refugee in Gaza City, referring to
the ache for lost homes, said: "There is a lot of fiction surrounding
this, of course. It becomes mythological. But I tell you, it is the
most important 7element of the Palestinian psyche, if you want to
'7
understand it."

Every people has its myths, however, and more often
than not they are incompatible. (The article quoted above,
for example, notes that "in coming to Israel many Jews say
they are returning to their biblical homeland.") 78 This is
why the great majority of the world's inhabitants are
skeptical of mythological solutions to the world's problems.
Instead, they have opted for the kind of hard-nosed,
empirical, historical approach that does not contemplate
years of intractable practice in the twinkling
undoing fifty
9
7
of an eye.

76. James Bennet, In Camps, Arabs Cling to Dream of Long Ago, N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2002, at A22.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 570 (1940) (prescription
in international law refers to 'the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory
through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it during such
a period as is necessary to create under the influence of historical development
the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with
international order"' (quoting LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 242 (5th

TIMES,

836

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

One of the defining features of modernity is its adoption
of a linear, directional, irrevocable conception of time,
history, and eschatology in place of the cyclical time of
myth.8 0 For modern man, there is no "eternal return" to the
beginnings, no "starting over" whenever things go badly;
instead, the actual historical past is the indispensable
condition for the present, the lens through which alone it
can be viewed, the paradigm in terms of which alone it
makes sense. Modern man's past is world history, not the
timeless world of myth; the actual historical development of
civilization is meaningful, in and of itself.
In the civilized world, however, the impact of terrorism
is greatly magnified by an inherent asymmetry between the
difficulty of creation and the ease of destruction. It is
always harder to gather up stones and form a monument
than to knock them all down.8 ' Civilization is synonymous
with creation; our civilized societies are all situated on the
vulnerable side of that unequal relation. In essence,
terrorism consists in the exploitation of this fundamental
asymmetry at the expense of the civilized world and the
historically settled expectations of the community of
nations.
The saga of "the Buddhas of Bamiyan" is a case in
point. The ancient Afghan city of Bamiyan lies in a high
mountain valley along the famed "Silk Road," the original
trade route from China to Rome. A great Buddhist monastic
center thrived in Bamiyan more than 1,500 years ago; its
most notable achievement was to carve in deep reliefdirectly from the rock face of the immense surrounding
cliffs-the world's two largest figures of the standing
Buddha. The Chinese pilgrim Hsun Tsang described the
magnificent Buddhas in 632, and ever since then Bamiyan

ed. 1937))); Michael I. Krauss & J. Peter Pham, Why Israel Is Free to Set Its
Own Borders, COMMENT., July-Aug. 2006, at 29, 32 ("Israel's legal claim to the
West Bank is... supported by the principle of prescription.").
80. "[P]rimitive societies ...

still live in the paradise of archetypes .

.

. for

whom time is recorded only biologically without being allowed to become
'history'-that is, without its corrosive action being able to exert itself upon
consciousness by revealing the irreversibility of events." ELIADE, supra note 66,
at 74-75. See generally id. 139-162; KARL LOWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY (1949).
81. See, e.g., Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506 (1871) (finding a right
to property in horse manure plaintiff piled up beside a road; plaintiff "changed
its original condition and greatly enhanced its value by his labor").
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has been considered one of the most important sites of
Buddhist art in all the world.8 2 To scholars of Asian art,
"[a]part from Bamiyan's rarity as one of the few examples of
monumental Buddhist sculpture, it holds a key to countless
and
questions about how Buddhism developed internally
'8 3
shaped or inflected virtually every culture in Asia.
The Buddhas of Bamiyan withstood attacks on them by
the Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan in 1222. They survived
similar attacks by the Moghul emperor Aurangzeb in the
seventeenth century. In light of this history, it is an acute
embarrassment to report that only in our time-on our
watch, so to speak-were the Buddhas finally destroyed.
Only in our advanced, "postmodern" era was the blind zeal
of fundamentalism finally complemented by the requisite
technological advances in heavy explosives.
On February 26, 2001, Mullah Muhammad Omar,
supreme leader of the Taliban, ordered the destruction of
all statues in Afghanistan, including pre-Islamic statues
like the giant Buddhas at Bamiyan. "All the statues in the
country should be destroyed," his decree said, "because
these statues have been used as idols and deities by the
nonbelievers before. '8 4 Worldwide protests quickly ensued.
Taking this as a sign that they were on the right track, the
Taliban proceeded to carry out the decree with brutal
efficiency. As international condemnation mounted, a
Taliban spokesman cheerily reported at one point that the
work of destruction was going well: "There is only a small
amount left, and we will destroy that soon."8 5 The Taliban
minister of "information and culture" was equally confident
of success, since "[i]t is easier to destroy than to build. '8 6 In
little more than a week, the ancient Buddhas (along with
all the statues in the Kabul Museum, one of Asia's most
82. See Karen Armstrong, Op-Ed., Breaking the Sacred, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

11, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 15.
83. Holland Cotter, Buddhas of Bamiyan: Keys to Asian History, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2001, at A3.
84. Taliban Decree Orders Statues Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at
A4.
85. Taliban Says Statues Are Nearly Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
at A20.
86. Barry Bearak, Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient
Buddhas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at A10.
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87
important collections) were gone forever.
Civilization is hard-earned, precarious, and subject to
ruin. The arts and sciences we take for granted today were
preceded and prepared by an almost unimaginably long
process of historical and prehistorical development. "To get
the matter clearly before one," suggests James Harvey
Robinson:

[L]et us imagine.., that 500,000 years of developing culture were
compressed into 50 years. On this scale mankind would have
required 49 years to learn enough to desert here and there his
inveterate hunting habits and settle down in villages. Half
through the 50th year writing was discovered and practised within
a very limited area, thus supplying one of the chief means for
perpetuating and spreading culture. The achievements of the
Greeks would be but three months back, the prevailing of
Christianity, two; the printing press would be a fortnight old and
man would have been using steam for hardly a week. The peculiar
which we live did not come about until Dec. 31 of
conditions under
88
the 50th year.

87. In the wake of the Bamiyan debacle, archaeologists and art historians
had to reexamine their longstanding assumption that artwork of historical
significance should always remain in its country of origin. See, e.g., John
Tierney, Op-Ed., Did Lord Elgin Do Something Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,

2003, § 4 (Week in Review), at 10 ("His methods were crude by modern
standards, but with his interest in history, he was a dedicated preservationist
compared with the officials and soldiers in 19th-century Athens and modern
Baghdad."). More recently, the directors of the world's leading art museums
have issued a joint Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal

Museums, which states in part that:
[O]bjects acquired in earlier times must be viewed in the light of
different sensitivities and values, reflective of that earlier era . . .
conditions that are not comparable with current ones.
Over time, objects so acquired-whether by purchase, gift, or
partage-have become part of the museums that have cared for them,
and by extension part of the heritage of the nations which house them.
[M]useums serve not just the citizens of one nation but the people of
every nation. Museums are agents in the development of culture,
whose mission is to foster knowledge by a continuous process of
reinterpretation.
Press Release, Cleveland Museum of Art, Declaration on the Importance and
Value of Universal Museums (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://www.
clevelandart.org/museum/info/CMA206_Mar7_O3.pdf.
88. James Harvey Robinson, Civilization and Culture, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
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This entire heritage we call "civilization" owes its
continuity wholly to cultural-as opposed to biological or
hereditary-transmission.8 9 If even a single generation
were to pass without the transmission of this cultural
heritage, civilization as we know it would cease to exist, as
surely as if it had never existed at all. The accomplishments
of civilization thus resemble an inverted pyramid balanced
precariously on a few basic arts and crafts, which required
a wholly disproportionate amount of humanity's time and
effort to perfect, but which would vanish in a generation if
not propagated and disseminated in a receptive cultural
medium. 90 Robinson suggests an alternative, somewhat
grisly scenario (of which terrorists will want to take note)
that falls short of total cultural amnesia:
Were a few thousand carefully selected infants in the various
progressive countries of the world to be strangled at birth not only
would advances in industry, arts and letters cease but a decline
would set in owing to the lack of those to make the essential
readjustments in our industries and their financing; to keep up
91
laboratories and books at their present standards.

The true targets at Bamiyan were not figures carved in
stone but the culture and civilization that made them
possible. 92 'The Buddhist art of China, Korea and Japan is
inconceivable without evidence provided by the Afghan
workshops,"' observes Michael Barry, a scholar of Afghan
culture. 93 'Which means that the destruction of the
evidence is not only an aesthetic crime, but also a scientific
crime as ghastly as destroying paleontological evidence for
BRITANNICA 824, 827 (14th ed. 1973) (1929).
89. See, e.g., RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 27 (New Am. Library

1959) (1946) ("The human cultural heritage, for better or for worse, is not
biologically transmitted.").
90. See generally Charles Collier, History, Culture, and Communication, 20
HIST. & THEORY 150 (1981).

91. Robinson, supra note 88, at 828.
92. Cf. GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 18-19 ("With the help of hindsight, we

can now see that the shelling and smashing of sandstone in March 2001 was the
Kristallnacht of the Taliban ....

The images targeted stood for our common

humanity, and when spring had changed to fall, humanity itself became the
target, on a more global scale.").
93. Barbara Crossette, U.N., in Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans, N.Y.
TIMES,

Mar. 31, 2001, at Al.
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certain steps in the formation of humanity itself."' 94
Iconoclasm is not terrorism as such, but it might be
considered the cultural equivalent of terrorism. The true
target of contemporary terrorism is Western civilization
and the cultural heritage and intellectual traditions that
define it, support it, and make it possible. When terrorists
destroyed the World Trade Center they unraveled the work,
not merely of a decade, but literally of millennia. In this
sense, terrorism should be viewed as an assault not merely
on the present but also on the past. Those who would undo
our present social, political, and cultural institutions target
a civilization deeply rooted in history, custom, and
tradition, whose institutions are defined, prepared, and
made possible by their own past. "Men make their own
history," Marx famously remarked, "but they do not make it
just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
9
found, given and transmitted from the past." 5
Concepts of history, custom, culture, and civilization
must thus be invoked to convey the true nature and gravity
of the threat posed by terrorism. They suggest, also, that
our response should be proportional to the threat that the
work of centuries might be undone at a moment's notice, at
the whim of those who have in no relevant way participated
in the difficult work of history. Those ahistorical forces of
destruction should receive no more consideration than if
they had just arrived at our shores from some distant,
alien, ill-starred galaxy.

94. Id.

95. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in THE MARXENGELS READER 594, 595 (Robert C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1978)
(1852).

